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It was not by mere chance that the United States near the
turn of the last century became the first country in the world to
establish a separate court for the handling of behaviors that
came to be called juvenile delinquency.' Americans always
have been beguiled and bewildered by youth. Europeans dur-
ing the Second World War often commented on what they
regarded as an extraordinary concern and indulgence by Amer-
ican soldiers for youngsters in battle zones and occupied areas.
The first juvenile court, established in Illinois in 1899,2
reflected a deeply-held American belief in the malleability of
young persons and their potentiality for reformation and recla-
mation.- Ultimately, the juvenile court movement would sweep
the world, but its ethos remains a reflection of American ideals.
"A democratic society," the United States Supreme Court has
said, reflecting these ideals, "rests, for its continuance, upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies." 4
Difficulty typically arises, however, when benign goodwill
fails to produce the kind of appreciative and positive response
that it is designed to elicit. It is one thing to have youngsters
who are of no particular concern misbehave; another to have
young people in whom you have invested so much emotion,
and for whom you believe you have done so much, to remain
* Professor Emeritus, Program in Social Ecology, University of
California, Irvine.
OS Professor, Program in Social Ecology, University of California,
Irvine.
1. See generally Roberts, The Emergence of the Juvenile Court and Probation
Serices, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES 56-60
[hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE].
2. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Il. Laws 131-37.
3. See generally A. PLArr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 46-74 (1969).
4. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (holding that
children under 12 may be forbidden to sell papers or merchandise on the
street).
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intransigently bad. It makes you frustrated and angry.' A
prominent sociologist has summarized the situation by noting
that
it seems clear that there is in American culture a strik-
ingly high evaluation of "youth" as a time of life. Yet in
this same culture, adolescence tends to be a period of rel-
atively great stress and strain, and the "problems of
youth" are the objects of widespread discussion and
concern.
6
Another well-known scholar stated the second part of the pre-
vious comment more tersely: the United States, he believes,
presents "one of the extremest examples of endemic filial fric-
tion in human history."
7
Frustration and anger are the twin reflexes that underlie
the recent proliferation of attempts to control delinquency by
use of the law to foster civil and criminal responsibility on par-
ents and guardians for the misdeeds of their children. These
actions are vulnerable to criticism on ethical grounds, particu-
larly because they punish one person who does not (and per-
haps cannot) control another for deeds done by that other
person. In addition, the laws are heir to the standard criticism
of general deterrence, that it is unacceptable to punish one per-
son in order to teach another a lesson: indeed, it has been
argued that unless punishment is "graded according to serious-
ness of inclination to misconduct rather than the gravity of the
misconduct itself,"8 deterrence is not a logical or ethical ration-
ale for dealing with law-breakers. Finally, and perhaps most
important, there is no evidence that the laws punishing parents
inhibit the delinquency of their children; nor does reflective
common sense or the theory dominating the study of delin-
quency offer support for the idea that they can do so. It is not
unlikely, in fact, that the laws contribute, at least in some cases,
to a deterioration of the parent-child relationship and, because
of this, to an increase in delinquent behavior.
5. Note the following plaint against parents: "We find that an element
of oversight, carelessness, disinterest, or ineptitude in the discharge of
parental duties appears in almost every case." Smyth, The Juvenile Court and
Delinquent Parents, in THE PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY 970-1 (S. Glueck ed.
1959). Cf Hoover, Punish the Parent?, 89 THE ROTARIAN 24 (Oct. 1956).
6. R. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL
INTERPREalrAON 77-78 (1964).
7. Davis, The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 523, 523
(1940).
8. A. GIDDENS, DURKHEIM 75 (1978).
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A particularly notorious use of the concept of parental
responsibility arising from motives of frustration and malignity
can be found in the announcement late in 1989 by the Israeli
army that it would impound property or seal homes belonging
to the parents of Palestinian children who threw rocks at Israeli
soldiers in occupied territories. This policy was inaugurated
despite reports that "the army admits that stone-throwing
among the thousands of children who wander Palestinian refu-
gee camps and villages is almost always spontaneous and
beyond the control of parents or adults."' More than half of
the stone throwers were said to be under thirteen years of age;
if caught, a large number must be released on bail because
Israeli military law forbids jailing children below the age of
twelve. o
Punishment in the United States of parents and guardians
for the acts of their children and wards has taken three major
forms. The first centers on statutes outlawing a variegated and
often ambiguous realm of acts labeled "contributing to delin-
quency." The second focuses on civil liability under the gen-
eral heading of "parental responsibility," and the third, the
most recent development, uses statutes or ordinances to deal
criminally- usually as misdemeanors-with what are defined
as illegal parental actions or omissions.
I. CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY STATUTES
The offense of contributing to delinquency was first incor-
porated in the 1903 Colorado juvenile court law, and now
exists in forty-two American states and the District of Colum-
bia."I Contributing statutes allow adults, including parents, to
9. Israel to Seize Property of Young Stone- Throwers'Parents, N.Y. Times, Dec.
22, 1989, at A3, col. 2. The article continues:
... [T]he military has tried to deter the children in the past by
fining, arresting and jailing their mothers and fathers. In May 1988
the army began enforcing a law that said parents could be held
responsible if they did not prevent their children from participating
in street demonstrations....
But before a parent could pay a fine or serve a briefjail sentence
for acts committed by one child, another son or daughter would be
arrested for hurling rocks. Soon Palestinian parents were facing
huge fines they could -not afford and the army was forced to jail
people repeatedly.
After a few months, the army quietly abandoned its policy of
fining and arresting parents. ld at cols. 2-3.
10. Id. at col. 2.
!1. See Garlock, Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors, in I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 240 (S. Kadish ed. 1983). For
1991]
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be dealt with in juvenile courts for behaviors that often are at
best arguably related to juvenile delinquency, even loosely
defined. In 1959, for instance, in State v. Gans, 2 the Ohio
appellate court upheld the conviction of the adoptive parents
of an eleven-year-old girl who had taken her from that state to
West Virginia where, with their connivance in misrepresenting
her age, she was married in what apparently was a legal cere-
mony. The Ohio law not only allowed penalties to be imposed
for actions "causing" but also for those "tending to cause"
delinquency. The appellate court declared that encourage-
ment to marriage constituted encouragement to truancy-a
delinquent act-and it deemed the girl's situation particularly
deplorable because she had been a good student. The mar-
riage "would have strong propensities to render [her] incapa-
ble of continuing her school attendance, with the probable
result that she would ... be found a delinquent child because
of truancy."'" This sophistry may have caused the court some
passing unease, because it then ventured a further guess at
what might happen if its prediction of truancy proved inaccu-
rate. If the girl were to remain in school, the Ohio court
declared, "the more successful her marriage would be the more
it could tend to cause her to act so as to adversely affect the
morals of her classmates."'
4
Contributing to delinquency laws are explained as encom-
passing "the broad purpose . . .to stamp out juvenile delin-
quency at its roots."'" Given such a judicial benediction,
appellate courts typically have echoed the guideline offered by
the Pennsylvania appellate bench that "no court should be
astute in finding reasons to relieve those who violate its provi-
sions."' 6 In State v. McKinley, 7 the decision of a New Mexico
court asked to rule on the vagueness of the state's contributing
to delinquency statute illustrates the illogic that often has been
discussions of contributing to delinquency statutes, see Geis, Contributing to
Delinquency, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 59 (1963); Comment, Contributing to Delinquency:
An Exercise in Judicial Speculation, 9 AKRON L. REV. 566 (1976); Note,
Contributing to Delinquency Statutes-An Ounce of Prevention?, 5 WiLiAMETrE L.
REV. 104 (1968).
12. 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 945
(1959).
13. Id. at 182, 151 N.E.2d at 714.
14. Id. at 183, 151 N.E.2d at 715.
15. Commonwealth v.Jordan, 136 Pa. Super. 242, 249, 7 A.2d 523, 527
(1939).
16. Id. at 251, 7 A.2d at 528.
17. 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964 (1949).
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employed to defend the punishing of parents for the acts of
their children:
The ways and means by which the venal mind may
corrupt and debauch the youth of our land . .. are so
multitudinous that to compel a complete enumeration in
any statute designed for protection of the young ...
would be to confess the inability of modem society to
cope with the problem of juvenile delinquency.'
8
Interestingly, Rubin19 has pointed out an inherent contra-
diction in the contributing statutes. It lies in the fact that par-
ents will not be prosecuted if their child's offense is so serious
that it is tried in an adult criminal court. If the child is a habit-
ual truant, for example, the parent may be held legally respon-
sible; if the same child commits murder, the parent cannot be
tried under the contributing to delinquency laws.
II. PARENTAL LIABILITY LAWS
Parental responsibility or liability laws are a second way in
which states have sought to punish, deter, or reform parents or
guardians ofjuveniles who have committed harmful acts. Prior
to the 1950s, only under statutory law in Hawaii2 ° and Louisi-
ana 21 could victims recover from the parents of underage male-
factors. 22 Hawaii's law, first enacted in 1846,2' remains the
most far-reaching by not limiting the financial bounds of recov-
ery and by imposing parental liability for negligent as well as
intentional torts by underage persons. The Hawaii and Louisi-
ana laws were in line with the civil codes of Europe, Central
and South America, Quebec, and Puerto Rico. These civil
18. Id. at 111. 202 P.2d at 967. Cf. State v. Crary, 10 Ohio Op.2d 36,
155 N.E.2d 262 (1959).
19. S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A RATIONAL
APPROACH TO PENAL PROBLEMS 38 (1958).
20. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1988).
21. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990). For
historical background on art. 2318, see Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.2d 270,
272-76 (La. 1975).
22. New Jersey enacted a statute shortly after the Civil War making
parents liable for vandalism damage done by their children to schools at
which they were pupils. The law was dusted off more than a century later to
join with other parental responsibility laws to the distress of justice Clifford
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, who, in a dissenting opinion, said that it
ought to be delivered a "sockdolager" [slang: a mortal blow], since similar
state laws now were available to reach the same ends. Board of Educ. v.
Cafliero, 86 N.J. 308, 326, 431 A.2d. 799, 808, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025
(1981).
23. See Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D. Haw. 1982).
1991)
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codes may reflect cultural emphasis on family solidarity com-
pared to the high value the common law places on
individuilism.
24
At common law, no recovery from parents for damages
intentionally caused by their children was permitted unless the
damage was due to some parental action or inaction,2 5 a doc-
trine that, as a common-law rule, typically was strictly con-
strued.26 Generally, the parents become liable only if (1) they
directed or subsequently ratified the act;2 1 or if the child (2)
was acting as the parent's agent or servant; 28 (3) was entrusted
with a dangerous instrumentality, such as a gun,29 or was negli-
gently given access to an automobile; 0 or (4) the parents' neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of the harm.3 '
Considerable attention was focused in 1989 on this com-
mon law rule of recovery when a Vermont jury found a ninety-
one-year-old grandmother liable for $950,000 for an accident
in which a car driven by her grandnephew, to whom she had
loaned the money to buy the vehicle, drove off a railroad
bridge. A passenger in the car lost his leg as a result of the
crash. The grandnephew did not have a driving license and,
with his companions, had been drinking heavily and smoking
marijuana on the night of the accident. The grandmother
admitted knowing that her grandnephew did not possess a
24. See Stone, Liability for Damage Caued by Minors: A Comparative Study, 5
ALA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1952).
25. For discussions, see Alexander, Tort Liability of Parents and Teachers
for Damage Caused by Children, 16 U. TORoNTo LJ. 165 (1965-66); Comment,
Liability of Negligent Parentsfor the Torts of their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV.
123 (1966).
26. See, e.g., Jolly v. Doolittle, 169 Iowa 658, 149 N.W. 890 (1914).
27. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Williams, 41 Kan. 56, 20 P. 497 (1889) (parent
liable for tort of minor sons, since offer to pay half the cost of any damage
from "ducking" sons' teacher in frozen creek deemed tacit consent).
28. See, e.g., Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971) (son
committed tort while on errand for his mother).
29. See, e.g., Mazzilli v. Selger, 13 NJ. 296, 99 A.2d 417 (1953). But see
Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694 (1950), in which the
court refused to impose parental liability in a case in which a 14-year-old
killed the plaintiff's spouse with a gun his parents had given him. The
parents knew that the son had several times pointed the gun at other people,
but this was held insufficient to establish that he was likely to commit
manslaughter.
30. See, e.g., Gossett v. Van Egmond, 176 Or. 134, 155 P.2d 304 (1945)
(court imposed liability on the parents of a mentally defective 20-year-old,
denied a driving license by the state, who killed an 11 -year-old while driving
his parent's car with their permission).
31. See, e.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675
(1953).
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driver's license.32 A retrial, based on the Vermont Supreme
Court's ruling that there had been error in excluding the auto
dealer from the trial, was avoided when the parties settled for
an amount that all agreed not to disclose. s
The common-law doctrine rested on the age-old founda-
tion that, unless specific exceptions had been set forth, there
could be no liability without fault. Take, for example, the case
of Moore v. Crumpton,s4 which was decided on common-law
grounds. A seventeen-year-old, with severe physical and psy-
chological problems, got drunk, used drugs, and then broke
into the plaintiff's house and raped her. The court, granting
summary judgment for the seventeen-year-old's parents, noted
that the case represented "the story of a modern American
family tragedy,"3 5 and then added, sensibly, that "[s]hort of
standing guard over the child twenty-four hours a day, there
was little that the defendant father could do to preventJohn, Jr.
from leaving the home after the father was asleep." 36 When
the limited reach of the common law was slightly extended, as
in Hopkins v. Droppers," such judicial rule-making won the
applause of scholars concerned about family irresponsibility,
such as the highly-regarded authority on the law of evidence,
John Wigmore:
[T]his is a period in which parents do very little for-
bidding .... [Tihe pernicious philosophy of education
now dominant, which apothesizes self-expression, is
interpreted to permit the child to make an unrestrained
32. See Loan Puts Widow, 91, in Jeopardy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1989, at
A8, col. 1.
33. See Widow in Vermont Won't Lose Home, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at
A20, col. 1.
34. 306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (1982).
35. Id. at 629, 295 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting Judge Wells) majority
opinion in the Court of Appeals in Moore v. Crumpton, 55 N.C. App. 398,
400, 285 S.E.2d 842, 843 (1982).
36. Id. at 626, 295 S.E.2d at 442. Cf. Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49,
504 P.2d 1272 (1973), involving a 14-year-old with a police record (arson at
ages eight and 11, theft of his father's watch at age 10, joyriding three times
at age 14, and running away at age 9), who beat a neighbor woman with a
hammer, told her to "take off [her] clothes and lay down on the floor," and
cut her ear almost entirely off. He relented only when offered a small sum of
money. The court felt that "it would stretch the concepts of foreseeability
beyond permissible limits" to hold the parents liable. Tellingly, though, the
court added: "We are certainly concerned about the serious problem of
juvenile delinquency and agreed as to the importance of generating a sense
of responsibility on the part of the parents with respect to the behavior of
their children." Id at 54, 504 P.2d at 1277.
37. 184 Wis. 400, 198 N.W. 738 (1924).
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fool of himself in as many ways as his immature impulses
may dictate. But that philosophy does not excuse parents
for letting the child make a nuisance of himself to
others.
5 8
Beginning in the 1950s, states sought to overcome the
remaining barriers of the common law by enacting statutes sim-
ilar to those in Hawaii and Louisiana to allow recovery by vic-
tims of intentional delinquent acts from the parents of the
perpetrators. Nebraska led the way with a 1951 statute, 9 and
today all states except New Hampshire have such laws.40
Slightly more than half of these laws permit recovery both for
property damage and personal injury; the remainder restrict
recovery to property damage.4 Part of the goal of such stat-
utes is to place the burden of a loss upon the parents of the
person who is responsible for the wrong rather than leaving the
victim to bear the cost. But more fundamentally, the civil liabil-
ity laws are intended to control juvenile delinquency by making
parents pay for the acts of their children. The Georgia parental
responsibility statute expressly decrees that its purpose is "to
provide for the public welfare and aid in the control ofjuvenile
delinquency, not to provide restorative compensation to vic-
tims."42 A NewJersey appellate court decision in 1981 offered
a similar rationale for that state's parental responsibility law:
The eradication of vandalism in public schools will
require more than a parental liability statute. But the
starting point for a solution could be a resurgence of the
belief that parents should take responsibility for their
children's activities. This responsibility comes with one's
status as a parent and reaches legal and moral dimen-
sions in our society. The laws of this State, if not higher
principles, may properly provide incentives for parents to
fulfill their roles in the lives of their children.4"
38. Wigmore, Torts-Parent's Liability for Child's Torts, 19 ILL. L. REv.
202, 205 (1924).
39. Nebraska's law also was the first such statute to be involved in an
appellate review. In Connors v. Pantano, 165 Neb. 515, 86 N.W.2d 367
(1957), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a child under 5 years old was
too young to be culpable for setting fire to the plaintiff's garage, and
therefore that his parents were not liable for the damage.
40. See Scott, Liability of Parents for Conduct of Their Child Under Section
33. 0) of the Texas Family Code: Defining the Requisite Standards of "Culpability", 20
ST. MARY'S L.. 69, 87-91 (1988).
41. See Note, Vicarious Parental Liability in Connecticut: Is It Effective?, U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 99, 121-24 (1986).
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3(c) (1982).
43. Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 NJ. 308, 325, 431 A.2d 799, 807
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With but one exception," and often accompanied by high-
minded dicta such as the foregoing, these parental liability laws
have been declared to meet constitutional standards.4" Some
of the early statutes-tiose in Georgia, Louisiana, and
Nebraska 46 -placed no limit on the amount that could be
recovered. Today the limits uniformly placed on recovery
range from $250 in Vermont to $15,000 in Texas, with an aver-
age of about $2,500."' The existence of such limits strongly
supports the conclusion that the primary purpose of these laws
is juvenile crime control, not restitution. This is particularly so
in regard to harms from violence, for which the injured party
usually would be able to recover much higher sums, if war-
ranted, from victim compensation funds.4"
In upholding the constitutionality of the parental liability
laws, appellate courts have evaded appraisal of the underlying
assumption that such laws will have an impact on juvenile
delinquency. In an Illinois case, the court ignored sociological
studies cited by the defendant which showed that peers and
social institutions typically play a larger role than parents do in
fostering or controlling juvenile behavior, and peremptorily
decreed that the "means employed [by the law] is substantially
related to the end sought[.]"149 Similarly, a New Jersey court
declared: "Though we acknowledge the difficulties of being a
(1981). Cf. Note, The New Jersey Parental Liability Statute, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 177
(1966) ("parental liability statutes . . . attempt to control or place some
effective check upon the rising rate of juvenile delinquency").
44. See Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971) (holding
that a mother and uncle were not liable for the act of 12-year-old boy who
threw a stone "at no one in particular" during a street brawl and injured a 10-
year-old). Some commentators have interpreted the ground for the decision
as lying in the absence of a recovery limit in Georgia. See, e.g., Note, Vicarious
Parental Liability in Connecticut: Is It Effective?, U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 99, 118
(1986). But a more accurate reading suggests that Corley was declared
unconstitutional because of the remoteness of any adult responsibility for
what had happened. Cf Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 320 n.7, 431
A.2d 799, 805 n.7 (1981).
45. See generaUy Note, Torts: The Constitutional Validity of Parental Liability
Statutes, 55 MARq. L. REV. 584 (1972); Kent, Parental Liability for the Torts of
Children, 50 CONN. B.J. 452 (1976).
46. See Meckel, Parent and Child-Civil Responsibility of Parents for the Torts
of Children-Statutory Imposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529, 538
(1958).
47. See Scott, supra note 40 at 87-92.
48. The maximum awards in each state are set out in A. KARMEN, CRIME
VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY 315 (2d ed. 1990).
49. Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 III. App. 3d 193, 196, 387 N.E.2d 341,
343 (1979).
1991)
312 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF L4W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
parent, we cannot say that there is no rational basis for the stat-
ute.' ' As Prescott and Kundin have noted:
It has not been conclusively shown... that these acts
encourage greater parental supervision of children,
thereby reducing the number ofjuvenile crimes. Thus, if
the purpose of the statute is deterrence, the act may not
be rationally related to that goal. The courts have side-
stepped this problem by finding that the possibility that
these statutes might effectuate the desired result satisfies
the rationality requirement.5
III. MISDEMEANOR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Ordinances enacted in August, 1989 in Dermott, Arkansas,
a city with roughly 4,700 inhabitants, represent a particularly
harsh, even ugly, legal reaction against parents of juvenile
delinquents. The Dermott City Council, in the wake of a street
fight the night before and a crime increase during the summer,
decreed a possible term of two days in the open-air stockade
for parents whose children under eighteen years violated the
eleven p.m. to five-thirty a.m. curfew. Further punishment
could include the publication of a parent's picture in a local
newspaper over the caption "Irresponsible Parent." If the par-
ents maintain that they are unable to control their minor chil-
dren, they must sign a statement to this effect, and the
youngsters will be referred to the juvenile court as delinquents.
The parents then will have to pay the city $100 for each child so
designated or perform twenty hours of community service.
52
The ordinances attempt to avoid the suggestion of vicari-
ous liability by defining the parent and child as fused into a
single legal entity, a doctrine that has been upheld in cases in
which parents knowingly accept items stolen by their chil-
dren,53 but which seems unacceptable in regard to the behavior
dealt with in the Dermott ordinances. Parents in Dermott are
not to be punished for past errors or omissions, but only for
complicity in a current act after a written notice had been given
regarding a prior curfew violation. As of March, 1990, the
Dermott ordinances had produced three warnings to parents,
50. Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 320, 431 A.2d 799, 805
(1981).
51. Prescott & Kundin, Toward a Model Parental Liability Act, 20 CAL.
W.L. REv. 187, 216 (1984).
52. See City of Dermott, Ark., Ordinance 609 (Aug. 21, 1989); City of
Dernott, Ark. Ordinance 610 (Aug. 28, 1989).
53. See, e.g., Beedy v. Reding, 16 Me. 362 (1839).
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but no further actions. The city attorney, responsible for draft-
ing the measure, believes that "the deterrent effect of the ordi-
nances has been tremendous."'
Forerunners of such enactments include an 1849 Arkansas
law making parents liable for a fine imposed on their child for
destroying another's property."5 In 1927, Minnesota passed a
law decreeing that the "[flact that a child has been adjudged
more than once to be a delinquent on account of the conduct
occurring while in the custody of his parents... shall be pre-
sumptive evidence that such parents.., are responsible for his
last adjudicated delinquency." 5 6 The statute was amended in
1953 to place it in general accord with the contributing to
delinquency laws in other states.5 7 A 1975 Trenton, New
Jersey ordinance made parents criminally responsible--and
subject to fine of up to $500-for the misbehavior of a child
who twice within a year was adjudged guilty of acts defined as
violations of the public peace. The ordinance was declared
unconstitutional, however, on grounds that it could not be said
"with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made
to depend."1
58
In addition, a 1985 Wisconsin statute made both parents
and grandparents liable for a baby born to unmarried minor
children. It imposed fines of up to $10,000 and possible two-
year jail terms.5 9 The act was expected to prevent teenage
pregnancy, but, according to the legislator who introduced it,
in its first five years, "by and large" it had not been all that
successful.' County social service departments had referred
107 cases during the first eighteen months of the statute's life;
financial support was ordered in thirteen of the cases. 6 '
54. Letter from Charles S. Gibson to Author (Mar. 2, 1990).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 50-109 (1959).
56. 1927 MINN. LAWS, ch. 192, § 7.
57. See 1953 MINN. LAWS, ch. 436, § 1.
58. Doe v. City of Trenton, 143 N.J. Super. 128, 132, 362 A.2d 1200,
1203 (1976) (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)).
59. Abortion Prevention and Family Responsibility Act of 1985. The
Act was "sunset" on Dec. 31, 1989 because of legislative concern that the
provisions might have a negative effect on parent-teen relations and, as a
result of parental pressure, lead to a higher rate of abortion. and lower rate of
establishing paternity. See WISCONSIN DEvr. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES,
FINAL REPORT ON GRANDPARENT LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF 1985 WISCONSIN
ACT 56 AT 4 (1988) [hereinafter WISCONSIN DEPr. OF HELTH].
60. Kantrowitz, Springer, Annin, & Gordon, Now, Parents on Trial,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1989, at 55 (hereinafter Parents on Trial].
61. WISCONSIN DEPT. OF HEALTH, supra note 59 at 2.
1991]
314 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF L4W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
More recent attempts, in court decisions as well as in statu-
tory law, to control delinquency by punishing parents for the
misbehavior of their children include a 1990 Florida law that
subjects parents to a five-year prison term and a $5,000 fine if
their child uses a gun that has been left around the house.6" In
Indiana, in 1989, the testimony of a state psychologist that the
parents' drug and alcohol abuse and marital discord had
"caused" their son's delinquency led a judge to order the par-
ents to repay the state $30,341 for the son's incarceration and
treatment in a correctional home.65 Several courts recently
have fined or jailed the parents of chronic school truants. In
Baltimore, for instance, a mother was sentenced to a ten-day
jail term for the truancy of her fifteen-year-old daughter. The
judge blamed the child's absence on the mother's "laziness,"
pointing out that she had failed to appear for several meetings
with school officials. ' Obviously, these truancy actions against
parents-and other enforcement procedures like them---are
not guided by the legal doctrine6 that an accessory should
never suffer greater punishment than has been meted out to
the principal.California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
Act' has been a widely publicized recent effort to punish par-
ents for the illegal acts of their children. The Los Angeles city
attorney who drafted the law has said that its aim is "to rid the
streets of hoodlums that are terrorizing and killing our citi-
zens."6  The Act allows parents to be arrested if their child
becomes a suspect in a crime and they have knowingly failed to
control or supervise him. The maximum sentence is a year in
jail and a $2,500 fine. Defending the law against criticism that
it was "headline justice," a Los Angeles city council member
declared that "it was a necessary tool to compel ... parents to
participate in programs to improve their parenting skills."6
She noted further that:
Before any parents are prosecuted under this law,
they are offered an opportunity for counseling as an
62. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05 (West Supp. 1990).
63. See Parents on Trial, supra note 60, at 54.
64. N.Y. Times (West Coast ed.), July 20, 1989, at A4, col. 3.
65. See, e.g., People v. Duncan, 363 I1. 495, 496, 2 N.E.2d 705, 706
(1936).
66. CAL. PENAL CODE, §§ 186.20-.27 (West Supp. 1990). The parental
punishment provision is found id at § 272".
67. L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1989, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
68. Molina, Law on Parental Responsibility, L.A. Times,July 11, 1989, § 2,
at 6, col. 5.
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alternative. It is only when parents have clearly not
demonstrated the capacity or willingness to control their
criminal children, and they refuse counseling, that they
are referred for prosecution.9
Echoing the Los Angeles city attorney, the councilwoman
insisted that "[p]arents of street hoodlums should not be
allowed to divorce themselves from responsibility for their
minor children who terrorize our communities."1
70
The first arrest under the new law was that of a thirty-
seven-year-old woman whose twelve-year-old son allegedly had
participated in the gang rape of a girl of the same age. Detec-
tives had seized two photograph albums in the mother's house
containing pictures of her and gang members posing in the
backyard with their hands making gang signs. There were also
pictures of her four-year-old son pointing a pistol at the camera
and her nineteen-year-old daughter wearing a semi-automatic
pistol in her belt. The investigating detective, after the house
search, declared: "I couldn't believe my eyes. In all my twenty
years on the police force, I have never seen anything like this.
It was obvious that the mother was just as much part of the
problem because she condoned this activity." '71
Two months later the case was dropped when it was
learned that the mother earlier had taken a parenting course.
A prosecutor indicated that it would not have been in the spirit
of the law to try her because she had taken steps to attempt to
control her child."
IV. PARENTING AND DELINQUENCY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE
The various legal sanctions against parents described in
the preceding section mean, of course, that parents can have
judgments against them, can be fined, or can go to jail for acts
committed by someone else. An American Civil Liberties
Union (A.C.L.U.) official has described the newer laws, which
are particularly punitive, as establishing as a crime the act of
"having a kid who commits a crime." The A.C.L.U. representa-
69. Id
70. Id
7 1. Gang Member's Mother Denies "Failure" Charge, L.A. Times, May 20,
1989, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
72. Mother Seized Under Gang Law Cleared, L.A. Times,June 10, 1989, § 1,
at 1, col. 3.
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tive maintains that the laws are "knee-jerk reactions to the frus-
trations of our more complicated age.""
There seems little doubt that the various forms of parental
responsibility laws are a legislative reaction to a juvenile delin-
quency situation that is regarded as out of control and impervi-
ous to routine penalties. As one commentator notes: "By
viewing parental responsibility statutes as penal in nature,
courts may be trying to establish a standard of care for parents
to follow."74 The conclusion of a review of the background of
Connecticut's 1955 statute could equally well be applied to the
laws in most other jurisdictions:
A single overriding concern about the increasing
amount of juvenile delinquency runs throughout the leg-
islative history of Connecticut's parent liability statute.
The primary purpose . . . was to curb juvenile delin-
quency, particularly vandalism, by using the law as an
economic club to force parents to act more responsibly in
their child rearing practices."
We suspect that, as with the more frenetic advocates of the
ongoing "war on crime" and victims' rights movements, there
also is in the parental responsibility drive an element of mid-
dle-class uneasiness regarding the illegal acts of minority group
members. Juvenile delinquents disproportionately come from
minority ethnic and racial groups, and there is a deep suspicion
that too often the parenting in these groups is not "adequate".
That this condition often is accompanied by inadequate hous-
ing, poor health care, substandard educational opportunities,
and similar deficiencies in the material and, ultimately, in the
emotional situation of those blamed is ignored.
It is of interest to note that juvenile court judges, who are
much more aware of the dynamics of delinquency than legisla-
tors and appellate court jurists, have shown reluctance to use
contributing to delinquency laws without some evidence of
affirmative acts that can be seen as clear contributors to the
wrongdoing. Juvenile court judges typically seek to enlist the
parents in a cooperative effort to make the family a more effec-
tive functioning unit.76 For their part, the parental liability laws
73. Parents on Trial, supra note 60, at 55.
74. Axel, Statutory Vicarious Parental Liability: Review and Reform, 32 CASE
W. Rms. L. REV. 559, 577 (1982).
75. Note, Vicarious Parental Liability in Connecticut: Is it Effective?, 7 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 99, 111 (1986).
76. See generally Roberts, Family Treatment, in JUVENILE JU TIcE, supra
note 1, at 220-44.
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suffer from the common failure of efforts to recover from per-
sons who commit crimes or those who juridically are declared
responsible for the consequences of their crimes: those liable
are judgment-proof because they have neither the insurance
nor the money to make payment. The newest group of laws
and ordinances inflicting criminal responsibility upon parents
for the delinquent acts of their children appears to represent an
attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the contributing laws
and the limited reach of the parental liability civil law enact-
ments, to get at those parents who, it is believed, will be
straightened up by the fear of fines and jail terms.
Based on empirical findings and theories from the social
sciences, how likely is it that these attempts to control delin-
quency will succeed? There is no question that the kind of
parenting children receive often will influence the kind of
behavior they manifest." A longitudinal study by West and
Farrington put the matter flatly: "[T]he fact that criminality is
transmitted from one generation to the next is indisputable." '
The use of the word "transmitted" implies some biological
process; but what the authors mean (as the context makes
clear) is simply that parents who themselves have gotten into
trouble with the law are more likely than other parents to raise
children who have the same problem.
77. See generally S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY (1950); Loeber & Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A
Review, 94 PSYCHOLOGIcAL BULLETXN 68 (1983); Patterson & Dishion,
Contributions of Families and Peers to Delinquency, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 63 (1985). A
popular contrary view is put forward in a chapter titled Parents Don't Turn
Children into Criminals in S. E. SAMENOW, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND 25-49
(1984). Samenow argues that the perpetrator must be held "completely
accountable for his offense" (id at 6), and asks, "if a domineering mother or
an inadequate father produce delinquent children, why is it that most
children who have such parents aren't delinquent?" (id at 17). That
"inadequate" parents sometimes raise respectable children does not
satisfactorily challenge the punishing of those who seemingly fail to do so.
Samenow does, however, introduce a point that supports our position:
When a teenager skips school, hangs out at a pool hall, joyrides,
drinks, smokes pot, and steals from stores, it should be no surprise
that he tells his parents little about his day . . . . [H]e will greet
parental interest and concern with accusations that the parent is
prying into his business. No matter how hard they try, mothers and
fathers cannot penetrate the secrecy, and they discover that they do
not know their own child. He is the kid who remains the family
mystery. Id. at 18.
78. DJ. WEST & D. FARRINGTON, THE DELINQ.UENT WAY OF LIFE 109
(1977).
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A comprehensive review by Loeber and Stouthamer-
Loeber of "all accessible reports on relevant research""9
regarding the relationship between parental situation and
behavior and juvenile delinquency bodes ill for the likely effi-
cacy of laws that punish parents with the aim of reducing juve-
nile delinquency. The study fundamentally concludes that
characteristics of the child-being "temperamentally difficult,
overactive, impulsive, or with a short attention span"-
together with the "limited resources" of the parents "to cope
with such a child" are the key precursors of delinquency in
terms of the family situation. The "limited resources" of the
family include "marital discord, loss of a partner, social isola-
tion, lack of social support from outside the nuclear family, and
poor parental physical or mental health." The situation can be
further aggravated, the authors note, by handicaps such as eco-
nomic hardship and large family size.8 0
Concurrent studies (i.e., studies that examine a cohort at
one point rather than over a period of time) indicate that the
manner in which a child is raised has less bearing on subse-
quent delinquency than the child's rejection of the parent or
the parent's rejection of the child.81 Though there are no data
on who typically rejects whom first, it can be noted that "it is
also difficult to love children who make one's life miserable."8 2
"Some children," the authors write, "develop multiple prob-
lem behaviors over time that are difficult to eradicate fully,
even for the most skilled parent," and "in the more serious
cases, the child will have developed behaviors primarily aimed
at undermining adults' attempts to bring about change in the
child's behavior."
83
The notion that parents can "create" delinquent children
does not appear from the review of research to provide a satis-
factory basis for the assumption that punishing parents will
break that chain or will induce other parents to pay greater
heed to their offsprings' waywardness. Hirschi, on the basis of
a highly-regarded research investigation, concluded that "[t]he
more strongly a child is attached to his parents, the more
strongly he is bound to their expectations, and therefore the
more strongly he is bound to conformity with the legal norms
79. Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factors as Correlates and
Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, 29, 30 (M. Tonry & N. Morris, eds. 1986).
80. See id at 97.
81. Seeid at 29, 33.
82. Id. at 54.
83. Id. at 33.
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of the larger system."" Hirschi maintains that even deviant
parents most often pressure their children to conform. But he
notes that in many instances neither the importance of the par-
ent-child relationship nor the parents' intentions can carry the
day:
(E]ven a parent who knows what to do and has the
will to do it may be hampered for other reasons. The
percentage of the population divorced, the percentage of
homes headed by women only, and the percentage of
unattached individuals in the community are among the
most powerful predictors of crime rates.8 5
To this caveat, Mays adds that "the way in which parents inter-
pret their roles is as much a function of the neighbourhood as
of their own personalities."
86
It has been noted that "[i]f... studies show that there is
no reasonable relationship between parental liability and the
deterrence of juvenile delinquency, there would seem to be
serious doubt as to the constitutionality of the statutes in so far
as their purpose is to deter juvenile delinquency."87 While
there have not as yet been studies that conclusively prove the
point, there is preliminary statistical evidence indicating that
the delinquency rate is not significantly effected by the adop-
tion of statutes that punish parents. New Hampshire, for
instance, which does not have a parental liability statute, has a
rate of juvenile delinquency that is different in no significant
way from that of its neighboring New England states, and is
notably lower than that for the country as a whole. 8 Similarly,
from 1937 to 1946, Judge Paul Alexander of Toledo dealt with
1,027 cases of contributing to delinquency, of which about one-
half involved parents. Three-quarters of the parents pleaded
guilty or were convicted, and of these, one-quarter were sen-
tenced to prison. On the basis of this experience, Alexander
noted: "We find no evidence that punishing parents has any
effect whatsoever on the curbing of juvenile delinquency ....
Imprisonment means breaking up the family; fining means
depriving the child and family of sust nance."8 9 Along the
same lines, a mid- 1960s study by a Deparment of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare official showed that from 1957 to 1962 the
84. T. HIRSCHi, THE CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 94 (1969).
85. Hirschi, Families and Crime, 7 WILsoN Q. 132, 138 (1983).
86. J.B. MAYS, CRIME AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 126 (1963).
87. Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IowA L. REV. 1037, 1043
(1970).
88. See WEBSTER, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 236-240 (1986).
89. Alexander, supra note 25, at 28.
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sixteen states which had parental liability laws showed a 27.5%
increase in their delinquency rates, while the increase for the
entire country was 26%.90
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that punishing parents
can exacerbate an already difficult situation. Note, for instance,
the following case, and consider how much more infuriated the
father might have been had the state fined or jailed him for his
child's behavior:
There was the post-encephalitic youth of sixteen...
[who) tampered with little girls. When parents com-
plained, the boy's mother pleaded with them not to
inform the police, saying that she and her husband would
handle the matter.
They reasoned with their son, warned him, followed
him about, and finally, after another tampering incident,
the father beat the boy almost to death .... The father
was a decent enough man. He had simply thought a thor-
oughgoing thrashing would "teach the lad a lesson he'll
never forget."'"
Anecdotal material, the New Hampshire statistics, Alexan-
der's intuition and the primitive calculations of the HEW offi-
cial, however, merely offer a hint of possible validation of the
assumption that the laws do not significantly affect delinquency
rates. To be scientifically persuasive, the HEW study, for
instance, should have matched the jurisdictions with the laws
against those without them (rather than the country as a
whole), and should have made an effort to compare contiguous
states to control for demographic and cultural differences that
play an important role in delinquency statistics.9 2 It also would
be particularly valuable to carry out a scientific investigation
that through interviews and record checks would determine
some of the actual consequences of the imposition of criminal
90. See Freer, Parental Liabilityfor Torts of Children, 53 Ky. L.J. 254, 264
(1965). We place little credence in the early popular press reports that
Michigan's parental liability statute was successful in reducing malicious
destruction of property. In Detroit, the total was said to have dropped from
244 to 192 cases, and to be down 50 percent in adjacent Lincoln Park.
Whitman, Michigan Puts It Up to the Parents, 68 READER'S DIGEST 161 (March
1956). Even if accurate, these rates undoubtedly long since have reverted to
the level found in sites of similar character. For a critique of the Michigan
acts, see Clute, "Parental Responsibility" Ordinances--Is Criminalizing Parents
When Children Commit Unlawful Acts a Solution to Juvenile Delinquency?, 19 WAYNE
L. REV. 1551 (1973).
91. H.L. STALLINGS & D. DRESSLER, JUVENILE OFFICER 123 (1954).
92. See generally A. BINDER & G. GEIs, METHODS OF RESEARCH IN
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINALJUSTICE (1983).
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penalties or civil liability upon parents for the delinquent acts
of their children.
Such research would provide a much firmer basis for opin-
ions about the benefits and costs of holding parents responsi-
ble for illegal acts of their children. It would allow more
rational evaluation of the histrionics against state intervention
in family life by libertarian writers such as Donzelot,9 s and
would respond to Pearce's reasoned suggestion that in this
realm "[d]etailed evaluations of the effects of specific legal
decisions should replace such a priorsm."' Legislators and
judges ought to be alert to the cautionary note that appeared in
the Seerbohm Report in Britain:
It is both wasteful and irresponsible to set experi-
ments in motion and omit to record and analyze what
happens. It makes no sense in terms of administrative
efficiency and, however little intended, it indicates a care-
less attitude towards human welfare. 95
V. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the idea of imposing penalties upon
parents for the waywardness of their children is based upon a
sound identification of one of the major links in the chain that
has fed into the production of the delinquent act. But the inad-
equacy of the laws-indeed, their nasty and vicious nature -
lies in their imputation of willfulness and negligence to parents
who often are doing the best that they can. It may be argued,
with Justice Holmes, that the law is justified in holding legally
competent persons to certain standards, regardless of the dif-
ferent capabilities within the populace to meet such stan-
dards.96 But the parental punishment laws deprive persons of
money and liberty not on the basis of what they provably do-
and have been given fair notice not to do-but upon highly
speculative presumptions that what they have done or (more
likely) failed to do is meaningfully affected by threats of a possi-
ble civil or criminal response. If, in fact, we spelled out what
we regarded as satisfactory parental behavior and punished all
93. See J. DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (G. Deleuze tran.
1979). For a critique, see J. MINSON, GENEALOGIES OF MORALS: NIETZSCHE,
FOUCAULT, DONZELOT AND THE ECCENTRICrrv OF ETHmICs (1985).
94. F. PEARCE, THE RADICAL DURKHEIM 102 (1989).
95. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL AUTHORITY AND ALLIED
PERSONNEL SERVICES para. 455, Cmnd. 3703 (1968).
96. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881).
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those who fell short, the outcry over this absurdity would
demonstrate at once the illogic of the current laws.
The need for further information is obvious; but lacking
such definitive data, we would recommend that legislators and
judges attend to the message that then-Governor Averell Har-
riman attached to his veto in 1956 of a parental responsibility
bill voted by the state legislature. Such a law, Harriman noted,
might "lead to added strains in families where relationships
already are tense and might even give to troublesome delin-
quents a weapon against their parents which they would not
hesitate to use.' 
97
97. A. Harriman, Veto Messages, in PuBuc PAPERS OF AVERELL
HARRIMAN, FIFTY-SECOND GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 240 (1956).
Cf Kenny and Kenny, Shall We Punish Parents?, 47 A.B.A. J. 804, 808 (1961)
(arguing that "in some cases 'punish the parents' laws would only encourage
more juvenile delinquency").
